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HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES IN US PART 121 AIRLINE ACCICDENTS
Bryan Nuñez, Carlos López, Jonathan Velazquez, and Oswart A. Mora
Inter American University of Puerto Rico
Bayamón, Puerto Rico
Kevin Román
Delta Air Lines
Atlanta, Georgia
The greater part of aviation accidents is often attributed to human error,
with flight crew performance accounting for the majority of these mishaps. In
2016, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published a rule to address pilot
professionalism and to increase the likelihood that aviators adhere to standard
procedures and prevent behavior that could lead to pilot errors in the airline
domain. The FAA has identified 5 Hazardous Attitudes that afflict pilots: macho,
impulsivity, resignation, invulnerability, and anti-authority. This study examined
the FAA-defined Hazardous Attitudes and the regularity with which they occurred
in the U.S. air carrier flight crew related accidents between 1991-2018. The top
two Hazardous Attitudes were anti-authority and invulnerability, which were
found in 92% and 68% of aviation accidents, respectively. The paper also
explores the relationships among these Hazardous Attitudes and other
contributing factors such as time of day, weather, flight conditions, and crew
resource management, among others.
Literature Review
There are a multitude of factors that affect decision making and Crew Resource
Management (CRM) within the cockpit. CRM is the proper use of all the available resources
(human, hardware, and information) to conduct and complete a safe flight (FAA, 2004).
Helmreich and Foushee found that the lack of CRM was responsible for more than 70% of the
accidents during the period between 1959 and 1989 (1993). Furthermore, Wetmore and Lu
studied general aviation (GA) accidents and found that Hazardous Attitudes have a great
influence in the aeronautical decision making (ADM) process of pilots (Wetmore & Lu, 2005a,
2005b, 2006; Wetmore, Bos, & Lu, 2007).
An attitude is a predisposition to respond to an event in a given manner (FAA, 2009).
Investigations have identified five Hazardous Attitudes, which interfere with the ability to make
decisions and exercise authority properly (FAA, 2009). These Hazardous Attitudes are macho,
impulsivity, resignation, invulnerability, and anti-authority (Table 1). Although they contribute
to poor pilot judgment, they can be counteracted by saying the correct antidote (FAA, 2009).
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was
published in 2016, to tipoff pilots to follow standards procedures and professionalism and to
prevent behavior, which could lead to errors (81 FR 69908-Pilot Professional Development,
2016). Historically, most of the research on Hazardous Attitudes has focused on the GA
population and the flight instruction environment (Hunter, Martinussen, Wiggins, and O’Hare
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2011; Stewart, J. 2006, 2008; Wagener & Ison, 2014; Wetmore & Lu, 2005a, 2005b, 2006;
Wetmore, Bos, & Lu, 2007). However, this study concentrated on the Hazardous Attitudes in the
multi-crew environment and focuses on which ones were predominant in crew-related accidents.
The specific research questions were:
1. Which Hazardous Attitudes are present, and with what regularity do these
occur, in flight crew related accidents?
2. What relationships exist between the pilot Hazardous Attitudes and other
contributing factors in these U.S. airline accidents?
Table 1.
Hazardous Attitudes Definitions and Antidotes as defined by FAA (2009, p. 2-5)
Hazardous Attitude

Definition

Antidote

Anti-Authority:
(AA)
“Don’t tell me.”

This attitude is found in people who do not like
anyone telling them what to do. In a sense, they are
saying, "No one can tell me what to do." They may
be resentful of having someone tell them what to
do, or may regard rules, regulations, and procedures
as silly or unnecessary. However, it is always your
prerogative to question authority if you feel it is in
error.
This is the attitude of people who frequently feel
the need to do something, anything, immediately.
They do not stop to think about what they are about
to do; they do not select the best alternative, and
they do the first thing that comes to mind.
Many people feel that accidents happen to others,
but never to them. They know accidents can
happen, and they know that anyone can be affected.
They never really feel or believe that they will be
personally involved. Pilots who think this way are
more likely to take chances and increase risk.
Pilots who are always trying to prove that they are
better than anyone else are thinking, "I can do it –
I'll show them." Pilots with this type of attitude will
try to prove themselves by taking risks in order to
impress others. While this pattern is thought to be a
male characteristic, women are equally susceptible.
Pilots who think, "What's the use?" do not see
themselves as being able to make a great deal of
difference in what happens to them. When things go
well, the pilot is apt to think that it is good luck.
When things go badly, the pilot may feel that
someone is out to get me, or attribute it to bad luck.
The pilot will leave the action to others, for better
or worse. Sometimes, such pilots will even go along
with unreasonable requests just to be a "nice guy."

“Follow the rules.
They are usually
right.”

Impulsivity:
(IM)
“Do it quick.”
Invulnerability:
(IV)
“It won’t happen to
me.
Macho:
(MA)
“I can do it.

Resignation:
(RE)
“What’s the use?”
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“No so fast.
Think first.”

“It could happen
to me.”

“Taking chances
is foolish.”

“I’m not helpless.
I can make a
difference.”

Methodology
The study used archival methods to explore the Hazardous Attitudes contributing to U.S.
Part 121 flight crew accidents. The primary data source was the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University (ERAU) National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database blue cover accidents
reports. Research focused on NTSB Accident Reports periodical, which cataloged 37 accidents
from 1991 to 2018. Excluded were all accidents with undetermined causes or those attributed to
terrorism. All 37 accidents, that fit the above-mentioned characteristics, were analyzed by 5
subject matter experts (SMEs) so as to identify any Hazardous Attitudes and the contributing
factors in the accidents.
The research team analyzed the accident reports to determine the presence of Hazardous
Attitudes that may have been influential. The researchers also identified contributing situational
factors, such as weather, CRM, airline management, flight rules, etc., that may have exacerbated
the effect of the Hazardous Attitude. A priori codes were used; specifically, the FAA-defined
Hazardous Attitudes. After the identification process was completed, the SMEs tried to find any
connections between the Hazardous Attitude and the other contributing factors. All the relevant
information from the accident reports was entered into NVivo (v. 12), a computer aided
qualitative data analysis software. The use of such software allowed for a second stage of coding
where themes began to emerge (e.g., additional contributing factors) in conjunction with the
Hazardous Attitudes themselves.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 and shows the regularity with which the Hazardous Attitudes were found in the
analyzed accidents. The number represented under “Yes” means the number of accidents in
which the Hazardous Attitude was found. Conversely, the number under “No” means the number
of accidents in which the Hazardous Attitude was not found. The top two Hazardous Attitudes
were Anti-authority and Invulnerability; these two were found in 34 and 25 accidents,
respectively. In addition, each Hazardous Attitude was further analyzed in fatal accidents. These
results are demonstrated in Table 3.
Table 2.
Frequency Count of Hazardous Attitudes in all Accidents

Yes
No
Totals

Hazardous Attitudes Total Accidents
AA
IM
MA
34
15
9
3
22
28
37
37
37
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IV
25
12
37

RE
12
25
37

Table 3.
Hazardous Attitudes Frequency Count in Fatal Accidents

Yes
No
Totals

Hazardous Attitudes in Fatal Accidents
AA
IM
MA
IV
13
3
3
10
1
11
11
4
14
14
14
14

RE
4
10
14

Relational Analysis Results
Figure 3 represents a Cluster Analysis performed by NVivo. NVivo can attempt
relational analyses through a dendogram such as this one. Cluster analyses are good visualization
tools based on the frequency with which words or coding are shared in the text. This figure
explores that relationship with word similarity. The dendogram indicates how sources of
information have word similarities, which in turn could suggest relationships between two
concepts. The proximity to, and color of codes within the diagram, suggests associations among
the concepts.
Anti-authority and Invulnerability share the same color, and are near, to CRM issues.
This result suggests that these Hazardous Attitudes are similar and are having an impact on the
ability of crews to perform well together. Both Hazardous Attitudes (i.e., Anti-authority and
Invulnerability) may lead to the bypassing of procedures and teamwork efforts, which ultimately
affect CRM. No other relationships between factors and attitudes were established by the
research team.
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Figure 3. Cluster Analysis between CRM and the predominant Hazardous Attitudes.
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Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
All of the Hazardous Attitudes were found in the reports analyzed; however, the two
more dominant ones were Anti-authority and Invulnerability. Anti-authority appeared in 92% of
the accidents analyzed; meanwhile Invulnerability was found in 68% of the accidents. In
addition, a relationship between these two Hazardous Attitudes and CRM was clearly established
by NVivo. Thus, it is unsurprising that both Attitudes were the top two in total and fatal
accidents.
As it was evidenced, the Hazardous Attitudes are affecting crew related operations and
performance. The results of this study, where Anti-authority is the top Hazardous Attitude is
aligned with Velazquez (2018) where he found Neglect of Flight Planning, Preflight Inspections,
and Checklists to be the top Behavioral Trap. Also known as Operational Pitfalls, Behavioral
Traps are accident-inducing attitudes that equally affect decision making (FAA, 2009). In both
examples of negative behaviors, pilots bypass rules and procedures, fail to follow checklists,
federal aviation regulations, and manufacturer recommended practices. Moreover, all of these
studies justify the FAA’s efforts to increase pilot professionalism in the U.S. Part 121
environment. Perhaps, it is time CRM training include a psychological element in which pilots
identify and manage behavioral factors such as Hazardous Attitudes. This training can include
scenarios and Hazardous Attitude modification techniques.
The FAA could implement more rigorously the NPRM (81 FR 69908-Pilot Professional
Development, 2016). It is highly recommended that pilots be monitored, mentored, and well
trained in CRM operations to avoid failures. After all, as Michael Huertas said, “We have some
of the best pilots in the world and should take full advantage of our pilot’s wealth of experience
to raise professional standards and cockpit discipline” (FAA, 2016, para 2). Every time pilots
enter an airline he or she should be briefed on how and why the majority of the accidents have
occurred. In addition, besides observing the operations inside the cockpit, the pilot should be
assigned to identify as many hazards as they can. This form of risk management should include
behavioral hazards. Once the crew is on the ground, all pilots involved should be instructed on
how to avoid them.
It will always be almost impossible to reduce human errors to 0% in an environment that
relies heavily on humans for its operation. However, these studies help identify the shortcomings
so that all involved can focus on improving safety and accident prevention.
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